



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

§

v.

§

CASE NO. 1:98-CR-100(1)

MORRIS DEAN KNOTT

§

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(I) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that Defendant, Morris Dean Knott, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Richard A. Schell. The United States Probation Office filed its *Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* requesting the revocation of Defendant's supervised release. The Court conducted a hearing on April 13, 2010, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. Defendant was present and represented by counsel at the hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that Defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of his

supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

- a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that his plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

A. Procedural History

On May 27, 1999, The Honorable Richard A. Schell, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sentenced Defendant after he pled guilty to the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony. Judge Schell sentenced Mr. Knott 63 months imprisonment and three years supervised release subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include financial disclosure, substance abuse testing and treatment, and credit restrictions unless the defendant is in compliance with all financial obligations imposed by the judgment.

On July 9, 2004, Morris Dean Knott completed his period of imprisonment and was released. However, since July 9, 2004, Mr. Knott was in state custody a total of 624 days. Mr.

Knott was received in Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) custody on November 4, 2005, with jail credit from January 26, 2005, on a four year sentence from Ector County. Mr. Knott was released on supervision on February 1, 2007. Mr. Knott returned to TDCJ custody on December 20, 2007, on a one year state jail sentence imposed in Ector County. He was released on August 29, 2008, upon completion of his state sentence. As such, his federal supervised release term was tolled 624 days resulting in a supervised release expiration date of March 22, 2010.

B. Allegations in Petition

The United States alleges that Defendant violated the following standard condition of supervised release:

The defendant shall report to the probation officer as directed by the Court or probation officer, and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month.

Specifically, the petition alleges that Mr. Knott has not submitted any monthly report forms.

C. Evidence presented at Hearing:

At the hearing, the Government offered the following evidence as its factual basis for the allegations set out *supra*. The Government would proffer testimony from an officer with the United States Probation Office. The officer would testify that Mr. Knott did not submit any monthly report forms the entire time he was on federal supervised release.

Defendant, Morris Dean Knott, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, Mr. Knott agreed with the evidence presented and pled true to the allegations that he failed to submit monthly reports as required.

D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant violated a standard condition of his supervised release by failing to submit monthly reports to his probation officer as directed.

If the Court finds that Mr. Knott violated his supervision conditions in the manner stated above, this will constitute a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke Defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2). Based upon Mr. Knott's criminal history category of VI and the Grade C violation, the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from eight (8) to fourteen (14) months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two (2) years, less any time the Defendant has already served in prison for a previous revocation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5th Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release¹, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be

¹ *See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id.* See also *United States v. Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and Defendant's own admission supports a finding that he violated his supervision conditions. The Court, therefore, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant committed Grade C violations of his supervision conditions by failing to file monthly reports with his probation officer as directed. Mr. Knott knowingly and voluntarily pled true and agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for the violations.

Accordingly, based upon Defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke Defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate further recommends that the District Court order Defendant to serve a term of **eight (8) months imprisonment**, with the recommendation that he receive credit for time already spent in federal custody on this matter. The Court finally recommends that Mr. Knott receive no further supervision term upon his release.

OBJECTIONS

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 1(a), 6(b), and 72(b). A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v.*

United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

SIGNED this the 15th day of April, 2010.



KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE